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Abstract
The results of twenty-four laboratory sessions are evaluated with respect to the role of alternative
definitions of equity when communication is introduced into an environment in which voluntary
contributions determine the level of public good provision to small groups of individuals. 
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treatments include the extent to which subjects have information about others’ payoffs from
(preferences for) the consumption of public goods and about others’ incomes and payoff functions
(preferences).  With communication, participants in incomplete information environments are less
able to coordinate their contributions while those in complete information environments succeed
more often.  Under complex heterogeneity payoff distributions widen with the introduction of
communication.  The data do not support the emergence of a particular pattern of coordination
across all treatments.
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Heterogeneity, Communication, Equity, and the Voluntary Provision of
a Public Good
1. Introduction
Chan  et al. (1999) report data from an experiment designed to capture aspects of a
common property environment contained within the regions of Halton and Hamilton-Wentworth
in southern Ontario, Canada.  The City of Hamilton, in Canada,  borders on a large harbour which
is subject to heavy industrial use but which is now increasingly viewed as a recreational and
ecological resource.  Under a Remedial Action Plan, two large firms, many smaller firms, two
municipalities, provincial and federal authorities are expected to undertake expenditures for
remediation and prevention of pollution in the harbour.  All parties have different sizes, different
interests, and different abatement cost structures.  This leads to payoff structures which are
imperfectly known to one another and almost certainly non-linear.  Although all agents are viewed
as  stakeholders in the health of the harbour, they face no binding regulation or external economic
motivation to undertake these expenditures.  Rather they discuss and co-ordinate their plans
through membership in a  restoration council and an  implementation team. 
The key aspects of this field environment are that the agents differ in at least two
dimensions (size and cost structure), that they are incompletely informed about each others’
payoff structures, that they can and do communicate with each other before making voluntary
contributions to a public good, and that the problem is non-linear in the sense that the optimal
allocation of resources almost certainly lies in the interior of the choice set.  The voluntary
contribution mechanism for the provision of public goods seems to be an appropriate model of the
field environment. This suggests that the theoretical and empirical literature on the voluntary1   Heterogeneity in firm size is captured by giving subjects different endowments and
heterogeneity in payoff structure by differences in the induced preference functions.  Chan  et al.
(1999) also find that with incomplete information, heterogeneous agents are more cooperative
than homogeneous agents.
2   We chose a three-person environment for consistency with our earlier experiments.
Bardhan’s (1993) suggestion that small groups are more likely to coordinate successfully implies 
that using three-person groups allowing communication should increase the likelihood of  optimal
voluntary contributions regardless of the heterogeneity characteristics of the groups.  Any
heterogeneity effect will have to be strong if it is to be observed. 
3   Ledyard (1995, 159-60) surveyed  five linear public goods experiments that have
directly addressed the heterogeneity issue.  Three of these (Marwell and Ames, 1979,1980, 
Bagnoli and McKee, 1991, and Rapoport and Suleiman, 1993) studied threshold public goods
environments, the first finding no effect of heterogeneity while the other two found some negative
effects.  Of the remaining two, Fisher, Isaac, Schatzberg, and Walker (1994) provides only
tangential evidence.  Brookshire, Coursey and Redington (1993) provide a controlled test of the
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contribution mechanism should give some insight into the problems faced in the field.  This
literature is reviewed by Chan  et al. (1999) who study the effects of  heterogeneity in endowments
and preferences on  aggregate voluntary contributions to a public good in a  non-linear
environment, under alternative conditions of information and communication.
1   The laboratory
experiment consists of three-person groups in a partners environment.
2   In general  incomplete
information has a small but significant  negative impact on aggregate contributions.  Heterogeneity
has a  positive impact on aggregate contributions, but its effects interact unexpectedly with
communication.   In a no-communication environment, heterogeneity in two dimensions
(endowment and preferences) increases contributions substantially while heterogeneity in a single
dimension (endowment or preferences) has little effect.  The reverse holds in the communication
environment.  There is a positive interaction between heterogeneity and incomplete information.
Thus the predictions of the Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) non-cooperative equilibrium
model are rejected and mixed evidence is presented on the conjectures by Ledyard (1995).
3influence of both heterogeneity and information in a linear environment and found that incomplete
information generally increased contributions.  On the basis of this survey, but warning that more
research is needed,  Ledyard  (p. 160) conjectures that,  with respect to contributions, he expects
a negative effect of heterogeneity, a positive effect of incomplete information and a positive
interaction between heterogeneity and incomplete information.  More details with regard to this
conjecture are presented by Chan  et al. (1999).
4   This section is reproduced from Chan  et al. (1999).
5   Instructions are reproduced in Chan  et al. (1999).   The payoff tables are available from
the authors and are forthcoming at  http://www.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/mceel/index.html  in
unpublished work in progress under  publications.
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While Chan  et al. (1999) reported the aggregate effects of heterogeneity, communication,
and information on voluntary contributions to a public good in small groups, this paper studies the
individual effects of these variables.  Of particular interest is the pattern of contributions made by
different subjects before and after communication is permitted, the character of the coordination
that is realized, and the ultimate effect on the distribution of payoffs realized by the members of
the groups.  The results suggest that communication and a little bit of heterogeneity may improve
the payoffs of all members of small groups whether information is complete or not, but that an
increase in heterogeneity may lead to reductions in the payoffs of some group members regardless
of the completeness of information.  Finally, incomplete information may lead to a widening of the
distribution of payoffs regardless of the extent of heterogeneity.
2. The Laboratory Environment
4  
In our laboratory environment individuals in each group of three repeatedly allocated their
token endowments to Market 1 (a private good market) or to Market 2 (a public good market). 
Subjects received written instructions which were also read aloud.
5   All instructions were framed
in neutral language.  Allocations were restricted to integer values.  Subjects were given tables-4-
(1)
showing their payoffs according to their own allocation and the allocation of the remaining
subjects in the group.  They reported their decisions and were informed of the results through a
network of personal computers.
There were 22 decision rounds in each session, divided into five phases.  The first phase
consisted of six decision rounds, during which there was no communication among the subjects.
The first two rounds were treated as practice periods and the data from them were discarded. 
The remaining four phases consisted of four decision rounds each, preceded by limited face-to-
face communication (see Table 1).  At the end of 22 periods, subjects were paid their accumulated
payoffs, converted from laboratory dollars to Canadian dollars at a rate common to all
participants that was announced at the beginning of the session.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Two information conditions were used.  In the incomplete information condition subjects
had no information about the endowments and payoff tables of other group members. In the
complete information condition they knew both the endowments and payoff tables (preferences)
of the other people in their group.  In all cases subjects knew their own endowments, payoff
tables, the identity of the other individuals in their group and when the session would end. 
   Each individual  i had an endowment of   tokens. The lab dollar payoff to individual  ,
, was derived from the function
where   is the allocation to the private good,  , is the aggregate allocation to the public-5-
good,   is the individual’s allocation to the public good, and   is a parameter which
characterizes individual preferences for the public good.
There were two levels of heterogeneity in endowments: same endowment (SE) with 
,  and different endowment (DE) with  , and two levels of
heterogeneity in preferences: same preferences (SP) with  and different preferences (DP)
with  .   In all treatments, the group endowment,  , was 60 tokens per period
and the aggregate preference parameter   was 27.  The two heterogeneity factors were
combined with the information factor in a complete 2x2x2 factorial design replicated 3 times
(Table 2 ).
[Insert Table 2 Here]
When communication was permitted, subjects with complete information were told that
they were permitted to discuss anything they wished, other than physical threats or side-payments,
for four minutes.  Subjects were also reminded that they had each others payoff tables, which they
could bring to discuss during the communication phases of the session.  They were also told that
any agreements they reached during their discussion would not be enforced by the session monitor
or by the computers.  Subjects with incomplete information were only permitted to share
qualitative information about their own payoffs.  They could state that a contribution pattern
increased or decreased their payoff, but could not state the quantitative change.  Recall that in
these sessions subjects had only their own payoff tables.  An invigilator attended each session to
monitor the discussion and enforce the rules governing communication.  No attempts to make
side payments or threats occurred in any of the sessions.6   If each subject expected both of the others in his group to increase their contributions by
one token each in response to his one token increase (  MG -i  /  Mg i  = 2 ), the resulting Nash
equilibrium will maximize the aggregate payoff.  Each subject’s contribution will be 7.33 tokens
more than in the Nash equilibrium with zero conjectural variations if subjects could make
contributions in fractions of a token.  Because contributions are restricted to integer values, the






In a non-cooperative environment the best response function for individual  i is given by 
This function is bounded below by the constraint that contributions cannot be negative.  Assuming
the constraint is not binding on any subject, setting n = 3 and summing over  i we obtain
Aggregate contributions in equilibrium depend only on the aggregate group endowment, W,  and
the aggregate preference parameter,  .  Given our experimental parameterization this is 21
tokens in all conditions.  The group optimum contribution is easily computed to be 43 tokens. 
Using the equations from  (2)  for each of the three subjects, the individual Nash equilibrium
contributions may be calculated for each type of subject in each of the four treatments.  These are
reported in Table 2.  Any combination of contributions totally 43 will yield the same aggregate
optimal payoff, but none of these combinations will be a Nash equilibrium.
6
In a full-information, non-communication environment, the Bergstrom  et al. prediction is7   These are homogeneity (SE/SP), two variants of heterogeneity in a single dimension
(SE/DP and DE/SP), and one variety of heterogeneity in two dimensions (DE/DP).
8   The subjects in these sessions were recruited through notices posted across the
McMaster University campus.  Respondents became members of a pool of potential subjects who
were invited to participate in different sessions conducted in the McMaster Experimental
Economics Laboratory.  By inviting members of the pool in alphabetical order we tend to control
the inclusion of  good friends as participants in the same group.  In ten of the sessions there were
two groups of 3 subjects; in the remaining four there was only one group.  In the two-group
sessions, the groups met in separate rooms and there was no interaction across the groups.
9   Chan  et al. (1999) shows clear evidence of end-game effects in the fifth, and last, phase. 
This motivates the decision to focus on the last four periods of Phase 1 and on Phase 4 when
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that the non-cooperative equilibrium will prevail in all four heterogeneity conditions.
7   The effect
of communication and incomplete information is not obvious.  Chan  et al. (1999) describe cases
that can be made for and against a negative effect of heterogeneity.  We adopt as a working
hypothesis Ledyard’s conjecture that heterogeneity in either or both dimensions will reduce
aggregate contributions and that there will be a positive interaction between incomplete
information and heterogeneity.
4.  Results
Seventy-two subjects in 24 groups of three participated in a total of 14 sessions.
8   Sessions
were completed in less than ninety minutes.  The average compensation for participating was
$27.75 (the range was $19.00 to $43.50; standard deviation was $5.37).
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Table 3 shows the general pattern of the results based on aggregated data.  Prior to Phase
1 there was no communication among the subjects.  Prior to Phase 4 subjects had two rounds of
communication followed by four private decision rounds.  The third round of communication
preceded Phase 4.
9   The data in Table 3 show that communication resulted in increases inanalysing the data.
10   We analyse the variance in 48 observations: the mean contribution for each of the 24
groups in each of Phase 1 (periods 3-6) and Phase 4 (periods 15-18).  This allows us to examine
concisely all interactions in our design.  The aggregate behaviour of groups of subjects under the
different simple heterogeneity treatments (SE/DP and DE/SP) did not differ and were pooled into
a single simple heterogeneity category.  When analysing the 48 observations we have not allowed
for the possible statistical dependence of the Phase 4 observations on the Phase 1 observations. 
Supplementary tests on completely independent observations, which confirm our results, are
reported in Chan  et al. (1999).
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aggregate contributions, communication in the presence of simple heterogeneity led to greater
increases in contributions than communication among homogeneous subjects.  Finally, complex
heterogeneity resulted in lower contributions under complete information and communication than
did homogeneity while the reverse was true under incomplete information.
10
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 Here]
We are particularly interested in investigating the affect of subject type on contributions,
payoffs, and the coefficients of variation of contributions and payoffs and on the interactions of
subject type with heterogeneity, communication and information.  Tables 4 and 5 report mean per
period contributions and payoffs respectively by heterogeneity treatment, subject type,
information condition and phase.  S identifies the mean contribution for the pair of subjects who
are the same within a group and D identifies the mean contribution for the subject who is different
from the others in a group.  Finally, we report the mean coefficients of variation of mean
individual contributions and payoffs by phase, heterogeneity treatment, information condition in
Table 6.  The coefficient of variation of mean individual contributions in a group in a phase
provides a measure of the distribution of contributions across individuals in the group during a
phase.  If this value falls across phases for a group, we can argue that the distribution of11   The heterogeneity conditions are represented as combinations of SE (same
endowments), DE (different endowments), SP (same preferences) and DP (different preferences).
SE/SP identifies a condition in which all subjects have the same preferences and endowments.
This is the homogeneity condition.
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contributions is becoming more equitable within the group.  The average across groups in a
treatment provides an aggregate measure of equity for the treatment.  An analogous comparison
may be made with payoffs.  Equity in contributions does not imply equity in payoffs. 
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Following Chan  et al. (1999), we will analyse data from Phase 1 (periods 3 - 6) and Phase
4 (periods 15 - 18).   Because the data in Tables 4 and 5 reflect more similarities across the
SE/DP and DE/SP conditions than across all heterogeneity treatments, we first test the
equivalence of the SE/DP and DE/SP conditions.
11
We conduct the analysis as follows.  First, we specify a fully saturated analysis of variance
model to explain each dependent variable as a function of type, communication, information, the
heterogeneity condition (SE/SP, DE/SP, SE/DP, and DE/DP), and all their interactions.  In
addition, we allowed for possible fixed subject effects by including a subject identifier as an
explanatory variable for mean contribution in a phase and mean payoff in a phase. We allowed for
possible fixed group effects by including a group identifier for mean coefficients of variation in
contributions and in payoffs.
We tested the equality of the DE/SP and SE/DP effects by estimating a restricted analysis
of variance for the four dependent variables in which we specified three levels of heterogeneity:
none (SE/SP), simple heterogeneity (SE/DP or DE/SP) and complex heterogeneity (DE/DP).  In12   For contributions and payoffs the F-statistics were 0.443 and 0.604 respectively. The
critical value of the F-statistic at the 5% level of significance with 4 and 58 degrees of freedom is
2.53. For the coefficients of variation of contributions and payoffs the F-statistics were 1.28 and
2.24 respectively. The critical value of the F-statistic at the 5% level of significance with 2 and 16
degrees of freedom is 3.63.
13   The remaining ANOVA tables are available from the authors and are forthcoming at
http://www.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/mceel/index.html  in  unpublished work in progress under
publications.
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no case was the restriction significant.
12
This led us to pool the single heterogeneity conditions, leading to a three-way
categorization of homogeneity, one-dimensional or  single heterogeneity (in endowments  or
preferences) and two-dimensional or  double heterogeneity (in endowments  and preferences). 
Tables 7 and 8 summarize the mean group contributions and payoffs by these new categories of
treatment for Phase 1 (no communication decision periods) and Phase 4 (the four decision periods
following the third round of communication).  Tables 9 and 10 contain the coefficients of
variation.
[Insert Tables 7 - 10 Here]
The pooled data constitute a 3x2x2x2 factorial design in heterogeneity, communication,
subject type, and information.  The main effect of communication on contributions was strongly 
significant (F-test; p = 0.000) while the main effects of communication and subject type on
payoffs were strongly significant (F-test; p = 0.000 and p = 0.019 respectively).  Dropping two-,
three- and four-way interactions with p-values greater than 0.500, we conducted the analyses of
variance reported in Tables 11 and 12.
13   Tables 13 and 14 report the analyses of variance of
coefficients of variation.
[Insert Tables 11 - 14 Here]-11-
Several observations with regard to individual contributions follow from Tables 2, 7, 9, 11
and 13.
Observation 1 : In the absence of communication, individuals who are predicted to make large
contributions under-contribute while those who are predicted to make small
contributions over-contribute.
Table 2 presents the conventional Nash equilibrium contributions by treatment and subject type. 
Table 4 presents the mean contributions by treatment and subject type and phase (Table 7
summarizes these results for the first and fourth phases and the trichotomous heterogeneity
measure).  Referring to Table 4, contributions by the high-endowment or high-preference
individuals consistently fall short of the predicted values of 13, 11, and 17 tokens in the SE/DP,
DE/SP, and DE/DP treatments.  For the complete information and incomplete information
conditions these values are 9.00, 7.08, 13.25 and 7.92, 9.25, 13.50 respectively.  Similarly, the
other individuals contributions exceed the conventional Nash equilibrium contribution of 4, 5, and
2 tokens.  Their mean values are 6.17, 6.33, 6.88 and 4.88, 7.88, 6.33 respectively for the
complete and incomplete information conditions.  These results are consistent with the predictions
of the equity theory model presented in Chan  et al. (1997) rather than those of the conventional
public good model presented by Bergstrom  et al. (1986).
Observation 2 : Information conditions have no effect on contributions by subject type,
communication condition or heterogeneity treatment.
The data presented in Table 7 in the first two subtotal lines suggest that contributions by subject
type across information treatments match each other closely.  This is supported by the analysis of
variance presented in Table 11, which shows that the main effect of information on contributions-12-
is not significant (F-test, p = 0.640).
  Observation 3 : Communication and complex heterogeneity leads to reductions in
contributions by individuals who are predicted to be large contributors in
the absence of communication.
Table 7 shows that with no communication, high-endowment or high-preference individuals in
heterogeneous groups contribute more than low-endowment and low-preference individuals.  The
contributions of the same type of individuals in the communication phase conform to a similar
pattern, but the difference across heterogeneity treatments is now reversed!  High-preference,
high-endowment individuals in the complex heterogeneity treatments contribute less than their
counterparts in the simple heterogeneity treatments while they contributed more in the no-
communication phase.  This difference is picked up by the significant three-way interaction
HxCxT in Table 11 (F-test, p = 0.019).
Observation 4 : Communication increases equity in contributions but given communication,
equity declines with heterogeneity.
Table 9 displays mean coefficients of variation which drop in magnitude from Phase 1 to Phase 4
for each heterogeneity treatment and information condition.  The ten of the twelve complete
information differences and eleven of the twelve incomplete information differences between
Phase 1 and Phase 4 coefficients are positive.  Accordingly, using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-rank test we can reject the hypothesis that the contribution distributions are not affected by
communication against the alternative that they narrow (p < 0.010 and p < 0.025 for complete
information and incomplete information respectively).  Pooling the information conditions we can
reject the null that communication has not effect with the same test (p < 0.005).    Furthermore, if-13-
only Phase 4 means are compared, there is a clear decline in these values moving from
homogeneous subjects to heterogeneous subjects.  Using an exact randomization test, the null
hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean coefficient of variation of the
homogeneous groups and the heterogeneous groups cannot be supported by the data against the
alternative that the mean coefficient of variation for the heterogeneous groups is larger (p =
0.044).  Therefore communication increases equality of contributions, but heterogeneity leads to
less equitable distributions of contributions than homogeneity.
Several observations with regard to individual payoffs follow from Tables 8, 10 and 12.
Observation 5 : Information conditions have no effect on payoffs by subject type, communication
condition or heterogeneity treatment.
The data presented in Table 8 in the first two subtotal lines suggest that contributions by subject
type across information treatments match each other closely.  This is supported by the analysis of
variance presented in Table 12, which shows that the main effect of information on contributions
is not significant (F-test, p = 0.582).
Observation 6 : Communication and complex heterogeneity leads to reductions in payoffs to
individuals who are NOT unique in a group.  In all other instances
communication leads to increased payoffs to all subjects.
The summary data in Table 8 indicate that in the no-communication periods mean individual
payoffs ranges from 694 lab dollars to 416 lab dollars.  In communication periods this range is
from 820 to 416 lab dollars. In spite of this overlap the main effect of communication is significant
(Table 12, F-test, p = 0.000). In addition, given subject type, communication has a significant
effect on payoffs (F-test, p = 0.013), and given heterogeneity class, communication has a-14-
significant effect on payoffs (F-test, p = 0.011).  The anomalous result is the reduction from 454
to 430 lab dollars with the introduction of communication for the individuals who have the low
endowments and lesser preference for the public good.  The data support the hypothesis that
communication does not lead to an increase in payoffs (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test
on the null that there is no difference between 454 and 430 against the alternative that 454 is
greater than 430, p < 0.100).  This stands in contrast to the overall result that communication
generally increases payoffs. 
Observation 7 : Given communication, increasing heterogeneity leads to increasing inequality in
payoffs.
The coefficients of variation displayed in Table 10 show comparable patterns across information
conditions and that given communication the mean coefficient of variation across information
conditions rises from 0.043 to 0.173 to 0.334 as treatments progress from homogeneity to simple
heterogeneity to complex heterogeneity.  The significance of these data are reflected in the
analysis of variance reported in Table 14 which indicates the heterogeneity and communication
interaction is statistically significant (F-test, p = 0.046) while the third-order interaction of
heterogeneity, communication and the information condition is not (F-test, p = 0.534).
Observation 8 : Given incomplete information, communication leads to increased inequality in
heterogeneous treatments.
Table 10 shows that communication unambiguously leads to a narrowing of payoff dispersion
within homogeneous groups.  With incomplete information, however, communication leads to
increases in payoff dispersion within heterogeneous groups regardless of the degree of
heterogeneity as the mean coefficient of variation rises from 0.183 to 0.262.  This difference is-15-
significant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test, p < 0.050).
5. Patterns of Coordination
After the first six decision periods subjects were given an opportunity to meet and discuss
the decisions they had made and the results of these decisions.  They were permitted, within
limits, to share information and discuss strategies for their decisions in subsequent periods.  Any
agreements with regard to contributions reached by members of a group were not enforceable. 
Furthermore, subjects never received information with regard to how much any particular
individual contributed (even under the complete information condition).  Because of the different
information conditions and the different heterogeneity treatments, different patterns of
coordination of contributions could emerge.  Of interest is the effect of the treatment variables on
the patterns of coordination.
Generally three patterns of coordination emerged during the communication phases of the
sessions.  In one pattern, each subject contributed the same number of tokens as each other
subject.  This is the  equality or e-pattern.  A second pattern is the  clean split or s-pattern.  Under
this pattern the subjects clearly make different contributions in such a way that the unique
individual in the group consistently contributes a different amount than each of the other two
individuals (who have the same endowments and preferences), who make the same contributions. 
The third pattern is the  cycling or c-pattern.  With this pattern the subjects take turns as the
contributor of zero or nearly zero tokens while the other two contribute all or nearly all of their
tokens to the public good.  This pattern may emerge across the phases of the session or across the
periods within a phase.  The latter occurs much more often than the former.  Because each phase
contains four decisions periods, the subjects tend to each contribute nothing in one of the first14   These figures are available from the authors and are forthcoming in  unpublished work
in progress under  publications at  http://www.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/mceel/index.html
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three periods, while the others contribute a large amount in each of these periods.  In the fourth
period, the subjects occasionally can agree on a common contribution or they agree to let each
individual contribute whatever he wishes to contribute.
Table 15 displays an array of symbols which identify any phases during which coordination
of contributions occurred.  The letters “c”, “e”, and “s” identify the instances of coordination.  If
no coordination is observed an “o” appears in the table.  Instances of coordination have not been
selected by applying a well defined mechanism to the data, but rather were chosen by examining
figures which display the contributions of each subject in each period of each session; this is
clearly a subjective process.
14   One cell in Table 15 displays a “d”.  During the first phase
following their first opportunity to communicate the members of this group agreed to each
contribute 18, 15, 10 and 7 tokens in the first, second, third and fourth periods of the phase.  This
pattern was not maintained and the subjects switched to a cycling pattern for the next two phases
of their session.
Clear patterns of coordination emerged in only one of six sessions in which subjects were
homogeneous.  The pattern of contributions and payoffs is shown in Figure 1.  Because subjects
are homogeneous, this pattern is consistent with both the e- and s-patterns.  Two of the subjects
contributed slightly more than the Nash equilibrium contribution of seven tokens towards the end
of the no-communication phase.  After the first round of communication they agreed to each
contribute fifteen tokens, and did this consistently through the final four phases.  This pattern
yielded payoffs of 635 lab dollars to each subject in each period.  Lowering their contributions to15   If one individual contributed fifteen tokens (instead of fourteen) and the other two
contributed fourteen tokens the aggregate contribution would rise by one token.  However, the
payoff of the person whose contribution rises will fall by 29 lab dollars while each of the other’s
payoffs will rise by 15 lab dollars.  It is difficult to coordinate on this outcome, and the net gain is
negligible.  Fourteen tokens each is effectively a symmetric optimum.
16   Examining the transcripts from this session may indicate that the high preference
subject is a dominant player in forming the strategy for this group.  This will be included in a
future draft.
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fourteen tokens a period would have increased their payoffs to 636 lab dollars.
15
Figure 2 displays the period by period contributions and payoffs for a session in which
cycling occurred across the first three communication phases and within the last phase.  In this
particular example the subjects were able to coordinate on the final contribution of the session,
although it is interesting to note that this contribution is well below one third of their aggregate
contributions in the previous periods.  Note that the individual with the greater preference for the
public good (subject identified with the open squares) is clearly realizing greater payoffs than the
other subjects.  Because this is a incomplete information session, none of the subjects know with
certainty what each subject earns from their decisions.  It appears as if they are focussing on
equalizing contributions.
16   The dashed horizontal lines in Panel 1 identify the conventional Nash
equilibrium contributions during the first phase and the symmetric optimal contributions for the
subsequent phases.  The high preference individual is always  under-contributing while the other
individuals are  over-contributing relative to these benchmarks.
Figure 3 displays three different patterns of coordination.  This is another complete
information session.  Subjects have different endowments and the same payoff functions.  During
the first phase following communication the subjects agree on equal contributions identical to
those selected by the subjects in the session displayed in Figure 1.  After communication prior to17   Except for Phase 3, the high-endowment individual’s payoff very close to or above the
equal payoff optimum.  The others, however, receive very low payoffs which are frequently half
of what the high-endowment individual receives.  With complete information and communication
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phase 3, the high-endowment individual is convinced to increase his contribution to a value which
nearly equalizes the payoffs of the three subjects (see Panel 2).  After the next round of
communication, the high-endowment subject increases his contribution, and slightly reduces his
payoff by slightly increasing the payoffs of the others.  In the final phase the subjects abandon the
equal payoff outcome and enter into a cycling pattern.  Each contributes nothing in one period
and his total endowment in two periods.  In the final period they return the pattern of Phase 4. 
This is clearly a coordinated strategy.  The high endowment subject gains 20 lab dollars over the
phase from the previous phase, while the other two each receive 18 lab dollars less.
Figure 4 shows an interesting pattern of a group learning to cycle.  The amplitude of the
cycle widens across phases, but because of incomplete information the high endowment individual
is able to conceal the size of his endowment and the cycle swings from zero tokens to 18 (the
endowment of the two low-endowment subjects).  The high-endowment subject clearly gains the
larger share of the payoffs to the group.
The final figure is an example of a group who is unable to form a coordinated contribution
strategy.  In this session the high-endowment, high preference subject successfully free-rides on
the other subjects.  Although his payoffs exceed those of the others in the group, they are below
those realized in sessions in which subjects are able to coordinate their contributions.  In this
session the addition of communication to complete information does not appear to improve the
ability of a small group of heterogeneous individuals to coordinate their allocation of endowments
in such a way as to increase their payoffs.
17it should be possible for everyone to be made better off.  Of course, if simple payoff maximization
does not characterize this subject’s objectives, he may be pleased with this outcome! 
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Five of the twelve complete information sessions display repeated coordinated activity by
the subjects in these sessions.  In three of the twelve incomplete information sessions, coordinated
activity arises repeatedly.  In one of nine sessions with homogeneous subjects coordination arises,
but in seven of twelve sessions in which the subjects are heterogeneous coordination arises.  Of
the emerging patterns of coordination, splitting contributions near to the split necessary to achieve
equal optimal payoffs is more common under complete information, while cycles tend to be more
common under incomplete information.  Coordination has a impact on the aggregate payoffs
received by groups across the periods within a phase.  The fourteen percent increase in payoffs
per phase realized by coordinating groups relative to those which do not coordinate is significant
(t-test, p = 0.000) and holds for both information conditions taken separately.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
Chan  et al. (1999) investigated the effect of heterogeneity on public goods provision in a
non-linear environment under alternative conditions of communication and information.  The
major observations were that communication increased coordination (which is well known) and
that with incomplete information heterogeneity increased coordination.  The character of the
coordination that evolved following communication was not discussed .  This was the objective of
the current paper.
This paper reports impacts on both contributions and payoffs.  During the phase in which
subjects are unable to communicate, the resulting patterns of contributions resemble those
reported in Chan  et al. (1997).  The individuals who are expected to make high contributions,-20-
according to the convention public good model, under-contribute, while those who are expected
to make lower contributions, over-contribute.  Under the simple heterogeneity treatments, mean
aggregate contributions were not different from those made by homogeneous groups.  However,
under complex heterogeneity, mean aggregate contributions exceeded those in the other
treatments.  This result is not consistent with the prediction of the conventional public good
model, but is possible from the model incorporating the notion of equity theory in Chan  et al.
(1997) taken from the psychology literature.  The mean contribution of low-endowment
individuals exceeds the 2-token prediction of the conventional model by more than four tokens,
while the mean contribution of high-endowment individuals is below the conventional model’s 17-
token prediction by more than three tokens.
Unlike the aggregate data, which reflect a weakly significant information effect, neither the
individual contribution nor payoff data display significant information effects by subject type,
communication condition or heterogeneity treatment.  Communication, subject type, and
heterogeneity do have significant impacts on contributions and payoffs.
Generally, communication leads to a narrowing of the distribution of contributions across
subjects.  Without an prediction about how communication will effect the contributions made by
members of these groups, it is difficult to evaluate this narrowing of the distribution of
contributions.  In particular, the contributions which lead to equal payoffs in the optimal state will
not result in everyone making the same contribution.  However, it is not obvious that this is
should be the ultimate outcome.
If individuals made contributions in the no communication phase which were consistent
with the conventional public goods model, given the parameterization of these sessions, each-21-
individual would receive the same payoff if a Nash equilibrium was realized.  If the individuals
focussed on trying to equalize contributions, high endowment or high preference individuals
would earn more than would the other individuals.  The data suggest that in the non-
communication phase subjects appear to be focussing on contributions.  However, the
introduction of communication results in the narrowing of the distribution of payoffs for
homogeneous groups as their mean per capita payoffs rise by between 25% and 30%. 
Communication has a similar effect on individuals in the simple heterogeneity treatments, for
which high endowment or high preference individuals did not realize as large a percentage
increase in payoffs than did the other individuals (approximately 30% for the former and 40% for
the latter).
This pattern of payoff increases did not hold for individuals in the complex heterogeneity
treatments or for individuals with incomplete information in the simple heterogeneity treatments. 
For groups with these characteristics communication brought increased inequality in payoffs.  In
the simple heterogeneity treatments under incomplete information both types of subjects made
payoff gains, but equality fell as the payoffs of the high-endowment or high-preference individuals
rose by about 45% while the payoffs of the other rose by about 30%.  For the complex
heterogeneity treatments, the payoffs of the high-endowment individuals rose by about 20% while
that of the other individuals  fell by approximately 7%!  Generally, given communication, increases
in heterogeneity resulted in increased inequality in payoffs.  The anomalous result, however, is the
inability of the homogeneous groups with incomplete information to generate total contributions
or payoffs which matched or exceeding those of the heterogeneous groups.  Their payoffs (and
contributions) are more equally distributed, but they are getting more equitable slices of a smaller18   The mean aggregate Phase 4 payoff for the homogeneous groups with incomplete
information 6444 tokens.  The comparable payoffs for homogeneous, simple, and complex
heterogeneity treatments with complete information and for simple and complex heterogeneity





No unique pattern of coordination emerges from these sessions.  Having complete
information does not lead the subjects to the equal payoff optimal, although when instances of
coordination are identified by studying the data for each session, payoffs are nearly 97% of the
optimal payoffs.  In the cases in which coordination does not emerge, payoffs are approximately
85% of optimal payoffs.  Both of these compare quite well to the 75% of optimal payoffs
accruing in the no-communication phase across all sessions (which is what would be earned if the
Nash equilibrium prediction of the conventional model was realized).
Although coordination is important the two which emerge most frequently are patterns of
contributions similar to the equal optimal payoff split and a cycling pattern within a phase in which
individuals contribute all or nearly all of their endowment for two periods and none or nearly none
of their endowment for one period.  The cycling pattern is not as effective as the equal optimal
payoff split.  It does, however, strongly suggest that a pattern that results in equal contributions,
rather than equal payoffs plays a strong roll in coordinating contributions.  In fact, the cycling
pattern is the dominant pattern in the incomplete information cases when it is impossible to
evaluate the payoffs of all participants.
Why should heterogeneity lead to higher aggregate contributions?  Initially we conjectured-23-
in Chan  et al. (1999, p. 17) that “the positive interaction with incomplete information may provide
a clue.  In heterogeneous environments the high preference or endowment individual has an
individual incentive to contribute more than the other members of the group.  When information is
incomplete, the other group members might interpret this higher contribution as indicating a
desire to co-operate and they might increase their contributions accordingly.”    Our review of the
individual data indicates that generally the high-endowment and high-preference individuals do
contribute more than the other individuals, and that with communication in cases of simple
heterogeneity their contributions rise.  However, with complex heterogeneity, the contributions of
these individuals tend to fall with communication, and the contributions of these individuals tend
to be much closer to those of the other individuals.  This phase of our investigation of
heterogeneity in public good provision will not be completed until we review the transcripts of the
communication rounds in attempt to discover more about the processes of coordination and the
ways in which these processes differed across homogeneous and heterogeneous groups.  Of
particular interest is the process by which the high-endowment subjects, who contribute most in
complex heterogeneity treatments prior to communication, are able get  others to increase their
contributions while the high-endowment individuals contribute little more or even reduce their
contributions.
If there is anything for the practical policy maker to take away from this experiment it is
that individuals in small groups are remarkably resourceful in their ability to generate processes
for coordinating their activities for increasing their surplus  even if they do not have a way for
identifying the optimal (surplus maximizing) allocation of resources.  In the incomplete
information cases, in which members of each group know only their own potential payoffs, and-24-
have no way of sharing this information with others, the homogeneous groups increased their
aggregate surpluses on average from 65% to 85% of the potential optimal surplus after three
rounds of communication.  For heterogeneous groups this increase was from an average of 76%
to 96% of the potential surplus.
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Table 1.   Structure of Sessions
Phase Type Phase Number
1 Action
No Communication 1 Play 6 rounds
2
Communicate
Communication Play 4 rounds
3
Communicate
Communication Play 4 rounds
4
Communicate
Communication Play 4 rounds
5
Communicate
Communication Play 4 rounds
1   Only data from Phases 1 and 4 are used in the analysis.  Rounds one and two of Phase 1 were
treated as practice periods and these data were discarded.-28-
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1   The parameters identified above are the subject’s preference parameter for the public good,
"i, and the subject’s endowment for each decision round,  wi.  If the value of either of these
parameters increases, then the subject’s return to public good consumption or the subject’s
endowment in each decision round increases.  Also note that the Nash equilibria contributions
are independent of the information condition.-29-
Table 3.  Aggregate Per Period Contributions
1
Homogeneous Simple Heterogeneity Complex Heterogeneity
Information Phase 1 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 4
Complete 22.92 36.67 20.54 39.46 27.00 31.08
Incomplete 18.00 25.83 21.34 38.75 26.17 29.83
Nash Equilibria 21 42 21 42 21 42
1  This table is based on the data reported on Table 3 in Chan  et al. (1999)-30-







Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
Complete Information
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1   SE indicates endowments are the same across all subjects in a group and DE indicates the
endowments are different.  SP indicates preferences are the same across all subjects in a group
and DP indicates preferences are different.  S indicates the mean contribution for the pair of
subjects who are the same, D indicates the mean contribution for the subject who is different. 
The underlying parameters are given in Table 1.  Each cell in the table represents the average
contribution by subject type across four periods in three sessions.  Data for periods 1 and 2
were dropped to allow for learning.-31-







Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
Complete Information
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1   SE indicates endowments are the same across all subjects in a group and DE indicates the
endowments are different.  SP indicates preferences are the same across all subjects in a group
and DP indicates preferences are different.  S indicates the mean payoff for the pair of subjects
who are the same, D indicates the mean payoff for the subject who is different.  The underlying
parameters are given in Table 1.  Each cell in the table represents the average payoff by subject
type across four periods in three sessions.  Data for periods 1 and 2 were dropped to allow for
learning.-32-
Table 6.   Mean Coefficients of Variation of Mean Individual Contributions and Payoffs per







Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
Complete Information
Contributions
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Payoffs
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1   SE indicates endowments are the same across all subjects in a group and DE indicates the endowments are
different.  SP indicates preferences are the same across all subjects in a group and DP indicates preferences are
different.  The underlying parameters are given in Table 1.  Each cell in the table represents the average
coefficient of variation of three subjects’ average contributions or total payoffs across four periods in three
sessions.  Data for periods 1 and 2 were dropped to allow for learning.-33-
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1   Homogeneous sessions have the SE and SP conditions, Single Heterogeneity  sessions have
either DE or DP but not both, and Double Heterogeneity sessions have both DE and DP
conditions.  “Same” identifies the mean of the individuals who are the same as another within a
group, “Different” identifies the mean of the individuals who are unique within a group.  There
are none of these individuals in the Homogeneous condition.-34-
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1   Homogeneous sessions have the SE and SP conditions, Single Heterogeneity  sessions have
either DE or DP but not both, and Double Heterogeneity sessions have both DE and DP
conditions.  “Same” identifies the mean of the individuals who are the same as another within a
group, “Different” identifies the mean of the individuals who are unique within a group.  There
are none of these individuals in the Homogeneous condition.-35-
Table 9.  Coefficient of Variation of Contributions by Phase
Homogeneous Simple Heterogeneity Complex Heterogeneity
Information Phase 1 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 4
Complete 0.490 0.066 0.281 0.180 0.512 0.297
Incomplete
 
0.317 0.095 0.412 0.185 0.476 0.163
Table 10.  Coefficient of Variation of Payoffs by Phase
Homogeneous Simple Heterogeneity Complex Heterogeneity
Information Phase 1 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 4
Complete 0.213 0.046 0.152 0.108 0.233 0.362
Incomplete
 
0.079 0.039 0.168 0.238 0.212 0.311-36-
Table 11.   Analysis of Variance Results for Average Per Period Individual Contributions
1        
            


































































1   The analysis of variance was conducted with 144 observations.  The root mean squared error
is 3.193.  The R-squared is 0.738 and the adjusted R-squared is 0.441.  The interaction terms
HxII, HxT, IIxT, and HxIIxT were dropped from the analysis of variance because of linear
dependencies in the model; CxII, HxCxII, CxIIxT, and HxCxIIxT were dropped from the
analysis of variance which used the complete set of interactions because their p-values
exceeded 0.500 (the p-values for each of these interactions were 0.505, 0.769, 0.835, and
0.528 respectively).-37-
Table 12.   Analysis of Variance Results for Average Per Period Individual Payoffs
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1   The analysis of variance was conducted with 144 observations.  The root mean squared error
is 97.530.  The R-squared is 0.800 and the adjusted R-squared is 0.559.  The interaction terms
HxII, HxT, IIxT, and HxIIxT were dropped from the analysis of variance because of linear
dependencies in the model; CxII, HxCxII, and HxCxIIxT were dropped from the analysis of
variance which used the complete set of interactions because their p-values exceeded 0.500
(the p-values for each of these interactions were 0.619, 0.990, and 0.575 respectively).-38-
Table 13.   Analysis of Variance Results for Coefficients of Variation of Mean Individual
Contributions during a Phase by Heterogeneity, Information and Communication Conditions
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1   The analysis of variance was conducted with 48 observations.  The root mean squared error
is 0.221.  The R-squared is 0.597 and the adjusted R-squared is - 0.052.  The interaction term
HxII was dropped from the analysis of variance because of linear dependency in the model. -39-
Table 14.   Analysis of Variance Results for Coefficients of Variation of Mean Individual
Payoffs during a Phase by Heterogeneity, Information and Communication Conditions
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1   The analysis of variance was conducted with 48 observations.  The root mean squared error
is 0.098.  The R-squared is 0.751 and the adjusted R-squared is 0.350.  The interaction term
HxII was dropped from the analysis of variance because of linear dependency in the model. -40-






























































































































Note: o indicates that there is no evidence of cooperation; e indicates equal contributions; s
indicates a distinct split between the unique individual and the other two in the group; c
indicates cycling within a phase; the shaded c indicates the cycling is across phases rather than
















































































































































































































































Figure 1 (Panel 1)     Token Contributions in an Equal Contribution Case
Figure 1 (Panel 2)     Payoffs in an Equal Contribution Case





















































































































































































Figure 2 (Panel 1)     Token Contributions in a Unique Cycling Case
Figure 2 (Panel 2)     Payoffs in a Unique Cycling Case
Note: Open squares, solid circles and solid squares identify the contributions or payoffs of each of




























































































































































































































































Figure 3 (Panel 1)     Token Contributions When Cooperation Takes Different Forms
Figure 3 (Panel 2)     Payoffs When Cooperation Takes Different Forms
Note: Open squares, solid circles and solid squares identify the contributions or payoffs of each of



























































































































































































































































Figure 4 (Panel 1)     Token Contributions in a Typical Cycling Case
Figure 4 (Panel 2)     Payoffs in a Typical Cycling Case
Note: Open squares, solid circles and solid squares identify the contributions or payoffs of each of
the three subjects in the group.  The open square is the subject with the greater endowment and























































































































































































































































Figure 5 (Panel 1)     Token Contributions When No Cooperation Emerges
Figure 5 (Panel 2)     Payoffs When No Cooperation Emerges
Note: Open squares, solid circles and solid squares identify the contributions or payoffs of each of
the three subjects in the group.  The open square is the subject with the greater endowment and
greater preference for the public good. 
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